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An Efficient Auction

Posted: 10 Sep 2002

See all articles by Motty Perry

Motty Perry

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality; Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic

Philip Reny

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Abstract

An analogue of Vickrey's (1961) multi-unit auction is provided when bidders have interdependent values and one-dimensional private information. The analogue is strategically equivalent to a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions and it possesses an efficient ex-post equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

Perry, Motty and Perry, Motty and Reny, Philip, An Efficient Auction. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=312470

Motty Perry (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel

Pennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic ( email )

524 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

Philip Reny

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-8192 (Phone)
773-702-7587 (Fax)

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