The Politics of Ambiguity

31 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004 Last revised: 1 Oct 2022

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alex Cukierman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 1987

Abstract

Politicians have generally two motives: they wish to hold office as long as possible and wish to implement their preferred policies. Thus they face a trade-off between the policies which maximize their choices of reelection and their most preferred policies (or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent). This paper analyzes this trade-off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent. First, we show that in general there is incomplete policy convergence: the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party ideal policy and his own ideal policy. Second, we show that under some circumstances, the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it more difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision. Thus, politicians may prefer to be ambiguous and "hide", at least up to a certain extent, their true preferences. This result holds for a wide range of parameter values and, in some range, even if voters are risk averse.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Cukierman, Alex, The Politics of Ambiguity (December 1987). NBER Working Paper No. w2468, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=318302

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

Alex Cukierman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 540 5360 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah ( email )

P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 4610101
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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