Defending Dignity

23 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2002

See all articles by Meir Dan-Cohen

Meir Dan-Cohen

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract

Individual welfare and autonomy are often seen as the paramount liberal values, enshrined in the "harm principle" which serves as criminal law's main limitation and guide. This paper challenges this picture by focusing on cases in which our considered moral judgment cannot be sustained by these values. To account for these cases the paper urges the priority of dignity over these other liberal values. Such priority is faithful to Kant's own moral theory, is better able to capture our moral intuitions, and helps accommodate the divergent moral views with which many legal systems are increasingly confronted.

Suggested Citation

Dan-Cohen, Meir, Defending Dignity. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=331200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.331200

Meir Dan-Cohen (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-7421 (Phone)
510-642-3767 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
627
Abstract Views
2,781
Rank
78,351
PlumX Metrics