Defending Dignity
23 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2002
Abstract
Individual welfare and autonomy are often seen as the paramount liberal values, enshrined in the "harm principle" which serves as criminal law's main limitation and guide. This paper challenges this picture by focusing on cases in which our considered moral judgment cannot be sustained by these values. To account for these cases the paper urges the priority of dignity over these other liberal values. Such priority is faithful to Kant's own moral theory, is better able to capture our moral intuitions, and helps accommodate the divergent moral views with which many legal systems are increasingly confronted.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dan-Cohen, Meir, Defending Dignity. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=331200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.331200
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