The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return

24 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2002

See all articles by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); European Commission; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute; Netspar

Koen Vermeylen

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2002

Abstract

We explore the implications of monetary unification for real interest rates and (relative) public debt levels. The adoption of a common monetary policy renders the risk-return characteristics of the participating countries more similar, so that the substitutability of their public debt increases after unification. This implies that the average expected real return on this debt increases. Also, the share of the debt issued by relatively short-sighted governments, or by countries that initially have a relatively dependent central bank, increases after unification. A transfer scheme that penalizes debt increases beyond the union average is able to undo the interest rate effect of unification, but further magnifies the spread of the relative debt levels.

Keywords: Monetary union, (relative) public debt, real interest rates, externalities, substitutability, central bank independence

JEL Classification: E42, E62, E63, F33

Suggested Citation

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Vermeylen, Koen, The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return (August 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=331522

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)

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Koen Vermeylen

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