Monetary-Incentive Competition Between Humans and Robots: Experimental Results

In Proc. of the 14th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI’19), IEEE, Forthcoming

9 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2019

See all articles by Alap Kshirsagar

Alap Kshirsagar

Cornell University

Bnaya Dreyfuss

Harvard University

Guy Ishai

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics and Center for Rationality

Ori Heffetz

Cornell University - S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics and Center for Rationality; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Guy Hoffman

Cornell University - Sibley School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering

Date Written: January 27, 2019

Abstract

Gill and Prowse (2012) conduct an experiment where an agent who is loss averse around her endogenous choice-acclimating expectations-based reference point is predicted to decrease effort with her rival’s effort (a “discouragement effect”). We adapt their human-human to a human-robot design: our subjects compete against a robot in a task that combines cognitive and motoric skills. By exogenously pre-programming the robot’s effort level we can switch from a sequential to a real-time competition. We find a similar discouragement effect, but a potentially weaker prize-size effect. We also examine subjects’ perceptions of and attitudes towards the robot and themselves, contributing to the literature on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI).

Keywords: Human-Robot Competition; Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences; Loss Aversion; Perceived Competence

JEL Classification: D84; D91; J22

Suggested Citation

Kshirsagar, Alap and Dreyfuss, Bnaya and Ishai, Guy and Heffetz, Ori and Hoffman, Guy, Monetary-Incentive Competition Between Humans and Robots: Experimental Results (January 27, 2019). In Proc. of the 14th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI’19), IEEE, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3323698

Alap Kshirsagar

Cornell University ( email )

Bnaya Dreyfuss

Harvard University

Cambridge, MA
United States

Guy Ishai

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics and Center for Rationality ( email )

Jerusalem
Israel

Ori Heffetz (Contact Author)

Cornell University - S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

324 Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics and Center for Rationality

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905
Israel

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org/~heffetz

Guy Hoffman

Cornell University - Sibley School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering ( email )

563 Upson Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

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