Mergers Among Debt Underwriters
46 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2003
Date Written: August 11, 2003
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of two large mergers of underwriters of corporate debt on their distribution and certification capacities. Compared to non-merging firms, the pure investment bank merger (Morgan Stanley and Dean Witter) and the hybrid merger (Citicorp and Salomon) both enhance distribution ability. Neither merger improves certification ability. Furthermore, mergers do not enhance these underwriters' prestige. In co-led syndicates, the listing of merging firms' names tend to follow those of non-merging investment banks, which implies that followers resort to more cumbersome mergers while leaders improve internally to stay competitive. Finally, all other commercial banks that underwrite corporate debt enhance their distribution ability similarly to the hybrid merger.
Keywords: Glass Steagall, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Underwriting, Mergers, Corporate Debt
JEL Classification: G21, G24, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Conflict of Interest in the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital
By Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner
-
By Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner
-
By Yasushi Hamao, Jay R. Ritter, ...
-
The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts
By Josh Lerner and Jerry Cao
-
The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts
By Jerry Cao and Josh Lerner
-
Competition and Coalition Among Underwriters: The Decision to Join a Syndicate
-
Earnings Management and Stock Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts
By De-wai Chou, Michael Gombola, ...