Regulation Fd and the Financial Information Environment: Early Evidence

Abstract

On October 23, 2000, the SEC implemented Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which prohibits firms from privately disclosing value relevant information to select securities markets professionals without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the public. We examine whether Regulation FD's prohibition of selective disclosure impairs the flow of financial information to the capital markets prior to earnings announcements. After implementation of FD, we find (1) improved informational efficiency of stock prices prior to earnings announcements, as evidenced by smaller deviations between pre- and post-announcement stock prices; (2) no reliable evidence of change in analysts' earnings forecast errors or dispersion; and (3) a substantial increase in the volume of firms' voluntary, forward-looking, earnings-related disclosures. Overall, we find no evidence Regulation FD impaired the information available to investors prior to earnings announcements, and some of our evidence is consistent with improvement.

Keywords: disclosure, regulation, earnings announcements, capital markets, earnings forecasts, financial analysts

JEL Classification: G14, G28, G29, K22, M41