Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, Feb/Mar 1997
Posted: 13 Nov 1996
Abstract
We provide a simple construction of social choice rules for economies with infinite populations. The rules are continuous, Pareto and non-dictatorial; they are constructed as limits of individual preferences when the limit exists, and otherwise as adequate generalizations. This contrasts with the impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and Chichilnisky (1980), which are valid on economies with finitely many individuals. Our social choice rules are, however, limits of dictatorial rules. This paper was written in 1970.
JEL Classification: D71, D60
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chichilnisky, Graciela and Heal, Geoffrey M., Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, Feb/Mar 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493
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