Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, Feb/Mar 1997

Posted: 13 Nov 1996

See all articles by Graciela Chichilnisky

Graciela Chichilnisky

Columbia University

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

We provide a simple construction of social choice rules for economies with infinite populations. The rules are continuous, Pareto and non-dictatorial; they are constructed as limits of individual preferences when the limit exists, and otherwise as adequate generalizations. This contrasts with the impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and Chichilnisky (1980), which are valid on economies with finitely many individuals. Our social choice rules are, however, limits of dictatorial rules. This paper was written in 1970.

JEL Classification: D71, D60

Suggested Citation

Chichilnisky, Graciela and Heal, Geoffrey M., Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, Feb/Mar 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3493

Graciela Chichilnisky (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212 678 1148 (Phone)
212 678 0405 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.chilchilnisky.com

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-6459 (Phone)
212-316-9219 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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