Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

26 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2002

See all articles by Michael Perino

Michael Perino

St. John's University - School of Law

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

Since Enron's implosion, an astounding string of accounting scandals have stunned the securities markets. Global Crossing, WorldCom, Adelphia, and a host of other companies have seen plummeting share prices and SEC and criminal investigations. Congress' reaction has been equally stunning and surprisingly swift. It passed with near unanimity the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and President Bush quickly signed it into law. This paper analyzes the new criminal and civil liability provisions of the Act to evaluate whether the Act is likely to achieve its goal of deterring securities fraud. The article concludes that the new criminal liability provisions actually criminalize very little conduct that was not already criminal under existing statutes and do not substantially increase the likelihood of successful conviction. The enhanced criminal penalties are unlikely to create additional deterrence because the Act's predominant approach is to increase maximum potential sentences. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, such increases have little impact on expected penalties. On the civil side, the article demonstrates that there was no empirical basis for increasing the statute of limitations for private securities fraud causes of action. Finally, the article concludes that the increase in resources and enforcement authority for the SEC may well provide more substantial deterrence than the more publicized criminal provisions of the Act to the extent that these provisions significantly increase the likelihood that securities fraud is detected.

Suggested Citation

Perino, Michael, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (October 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=350540 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.350540

Michael Perino (Contact Author)

St. John's University - School of Law ( email )

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