Temporary Shocks and Unavoidable Transistions to a High-Unemployment Regime

37 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2002 Last revised: 20 Jul 2022

See all articles by Wouter J. den Haan

Wouter J. den Haan

University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2002

Abstract

This paper develops a model with multiple steady states (low tax and low unemployment versus high tax and high unemployment) in which equilibrium selection is not conditioned on a sunspot variable. Instead, large temporary shocks initiate unavoidable transitions from one steady state to another. Tax policies have huge effects in some cases. In particular, it is possible that the transition to the high-unemployment steady state after a negative shock can be avoided if the government borrows to finance unemployment benefits, and in some cases it is even possible that a credible permanent tax cut would force the economy out of the high-unemployment steady state. The model is used to explain the high European unemployment rates in the 80's and 90's. The paper argues that the increase in unemployment during the 70's played a key role because it led to an increase in the obligation to pay unemployment benefits. The implied tax burden was so big that the transition to the highunemployment regime was the unique equilibrium outcome.

Suggested Citation

Den Haan, Wouter J., Temporary Shocks and Unavoidable Transistions to a High-Unemployment Regime (November 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9349, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=353759

Wouter J. Den Haan (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www1.feb.uva.nl/toe/content/people/content/denhaan/pers.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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