Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer

13 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 1997

See all articles by Freek van Megen

Freek van Megen

Independent

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: February 23, 1996

Abstract

A class of non cooperative games characterized by a "congestion effect" is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy profiles maximizing the potential function coincide. The structure of the class is investigated and it turns out that this class constitutes a cone. Remarks on strictly strong Nash equilibria and relaxations are provided.

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

van Megen, Freek and Facchini, Giovanni and Borm, Peter E. M. and Tijs, Stef H., Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer (February 23, 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=38981 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.38981

Freek Van Megen

Independent

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://paople.few.eur.nl/facchini

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Stef H. Tijs (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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