Icelandic Fisheries Management: Fees Versus Quotas

36 Pages Posted: 28 May 2003

See all articles by Thorvaldur Gylfason

Thorvaldur Gylfason

University of Iceland - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Martin Weitzman

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

We discuss the quota system by which Iceland's fisheries have been managed since 1984, and explore its implications for economic efficiency as well as fairness. We argue that the shortcomings of the Icelandic quota system are inherent in any type of quota system applied to high-seas fishing. Further, we find that regulating access to a limited, stochastic common-property natural resource such as Iceland's fish by fee rather than by quota - i.e., by relying on price incentives rather than quantitative restrictions - would constitute a more equitable and more efficient solution to the fisheries management problem. Our argument applies to the management of all open-seas fisheries, including the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union.

Keywords: Fisheries management

JEL Classification: Q28

Suggested Citation

Gylfason, Thorvaldur and Weitzman, Martin L., Icelandic Fisheries Management: Fees Versus Quotas (March 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412004

Thorvaldur Gylfason

University of Iceland - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

IS-101 Reykjavik
Iceland
+354 525 4533/00 (Phone)
+354 552 6806 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hi.is/~gylfason/inenglish.htm)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Martin L. Weitzman (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5133 (Phone)

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