The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents
Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1804
59 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2003
Date Written: May 2003
Abstract
Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a mechanism for the litigation of pharmaceutical patent infringement disputes. Many of these cases have been settled with "reverse payments" by the brand to the generic in return for delayed generic entry. The FTC has contested a number of these settlements with good but not complete success. This paper argues for per se illegality of settlements that include side payments or deals which are beneficial to the generic. Further, the paper shows a number of additional strategies beyond side payments, some highly questionable from an antitrust perspective, that brands have used to keep out generics.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Higher Prices from Entry: Pricing of Brand-Name Drugs
By Jeffrey M. Perloff, Valerie Y. Suslow, ...
-
By Ernst R. Berndt, Linda Tm Bui, ...
-
Consumption Externalities and Diffusion in Pharmaceutical Markets: Antiulcer Drugs
By Ernst R. Berndt, Robert S. Pindyck, ...
-
Generic Drug Industry Dynamics
By David Reiffen and Michael R. Ward
-
Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs
By Iain M. Cockburn and Aslam H. Anis
-
Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition: The Waxman-Hatch Act after One Decade
By Henry G. Grabowski and John M. Vernon