Improving Cash-Constrained Smallholder Farmers’ Revenue: The Role of Government Loans

30 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2022 Last revised: 1 Nov 2022

See all articles by Kenneth Pay

Kenneth Pay

Independent

Somya Singhvi

USC Marshall School of Business

Yanchong Zheng

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Operations Research Center

Date Written: June 14, 2022

Abstract

Problem definition: Extreme poverty continues to persist among smallholder farmers in developing countries. One critical challenge faced by these farmers is that the need for immediate cash often forces them to sell their crops when market price is low, thus hurting their revenue. This paper examines how cash constraints influence farmers' selling decisions across the harvest and lean seasons, as well as to analyze the efficacy of government loan programs in improving farmers' revenue.

Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model to fully characterize the market equilibrium under the base scenario of no government loan, uncovering the differential impacts of cash constraints on the revenue of farmers with different production quantities. We then examine how a government loan program may counteract these negative impacts. Under a government loan, farmers store some of their production quantities at government warehouses in exchange of immediate cash. We analyze and contrast two types of loan policies, one in which all farmers are eligible to access the loan (defined as a homogeneous loan) and the other in which the loan is only offered to farmers whose production quantity is below a certain threshold (defined as a heterogeneous loan).

Managerial Implications: Our results demonstrate when access to the loan may benefit farmers and when a heterogeneous policy is more desirable. We show that, when designed properly, the loan can simultaneously increase aggregate farmer revenue and generate more equitable revenue distribution among the farmers. Nevertheless, we also highlight that overly generous loan policies may be counterproductive and inadvertently hurt farmers' revenue. Taken together, these results underscore that government loan policy design must carefully account for farmers' strategic response to the policy in order to generate positive societal outcomes. Finally, we use field data of Bengal gram farmers in India to empirically validate our modeling insights and quantify the revenue impact of the loan policies studied.

Keywords: socially responsible operations, smallholder farmers, cash constraints, government loan, policy design

Suggested Citation

Pay, Kenneth and Singhvi, Somya and Zheng, Yanchong, Improving Cash-Constrained Smallholder Farmers’ Revenue: The Role of Government Loans (June 14, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4135868 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4135868

Kenneth Pay

Independent ( email )

Somya Singhvi (Contact Author)

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA
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Yanchong Zheng

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Operations Research Center ( email )

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Bldg. E 40-149
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

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