The Costs and Benefits of Transactional Certainty: An Appraisal of Omnicare V. Ncs Healthcare

76 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2003

See all articles by Sean J. Griffith

Sean J. Griffith

Fordham University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: June 1, 2003

Abstract

In Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, the Delaware Supreme Court recently announced what appears to be a bright-line rule against transactional certainty in mergers and acquisitions. Even in the context of a friendly merger agreement - that is, a negotiated transaction not involving a "change in control" - target boards may not agree to a fully protected merger agreement. Instead, it is now a requirement of law that target boards always include an escape clause, in the form of a fiduciary out, in their merger agreements. As a result, targets can no longer follow a "precommitment strategy," offering contractual certainty as a means of negotiating a better deal for shareholders.

This article engages in a close analysis of the NCS opinion, first probing the doctrinal foundations then the policy implications of the majority's holding. As a matter of doctrine, I show that existing precedent neither compels nor supports the bright-line rule announced by the Court. Worse, as a matter of policy, the Court's open hostility to precommitment strategies is likely to harm shareholder welfare. Finally, I draw upon economic theory to propose an alternative rule that would preserve, under certain circumstances, the ability of target boards to follow an affirmative precommitment strategy.

Keywords: Omnicare, NCS, takeover, merger, acquisition, deal protection, lock up, precommitment, fiduciary out, last period, final period, delaware supreme court, transactional certainty, merger agreement

Suggested Citation

Griffith, Sean J., The Costs and Benefits of Transactional Certainty: An Appraisal of Omnicare V. Ncs Healthcare (June 1, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=418780 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.418780

Sean J. Griffith (Contact Author)

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

150 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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