A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications
University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2000-2
Posted: 12 Oct 2003
Date Written: February 2000
Abstract
We construct a market based mechanism that induces players in a non-cooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problems of "The Tragedy of the Commons" and "R&D Spillovers in Duopoly".
Keywords: Cooperation, Externalities, Spillovers, Eficiency
JEL Classification: C72, D62, H40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ellis, Christopher J. and van den Nouweland, Anne, A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications (February 2000). University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2000-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436522
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