Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version

17 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2003

See all articles by George J. Mailath

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: August 15, 2003

Abstract

We examine contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best E response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect E-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect E-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.

Keywords: Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

JEL Classification: C70, C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J. and Postlewaite, Andrew and Samuelson, Larry, Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version (August 15, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436821 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436821

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States