Color-Blind Affirmative Action

39 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2003 Last revised: 11 Aug 2022

See all articles by Roland G. Fryer

Roland G. Fryer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); American Bar Foundation; University of Chicago

Tolga Yuret

Boston University - Department of Economics

Glenn C. Loury

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

This paper presents a conceptual framework for understanding the consequences of the widespread adoption of race-neutral alternatives' to conventional racial affirmative action policies in college admissions. A simple model of applicant competition with endogenous effort is utilized to show that, in comparison to color-conscious affirmative action, these color-blind alternatives can significantly lower the efficiency of the student selection process in equilibrium. We examine data on matriculates at several selective colleges and universities to estimate the magnitudes involved. It is shown that the short-run efficiency losses of implementing color-blind affirmative action (in our sample) are four to five times as high as color-conscious affirmative action.

Suggested Citation

Fryer, Roland G. and Yuret, Tolga and Loury, Glenn C., Color-Blind Affirmative Action (November 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w10103, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=468790

Roland G. Fryer (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Tolga Yuret

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Glenn C. Loury

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States