The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy

41 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2003

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

This paper provides a compact account of the problem of distorted choice in corporate takeovers. (A more detailed account is provided in, "Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers"). I analyze how the tender decisions of shareholders facing a takeover bid might be distorted. I also put forward an approach for addressing this problem, as well as analyze several alternative remedies.

Keywords: Takeovers, targets, pressure, tender offers, for tender anti-takeover arrangements, anti-takeover statues, minority shares, freeze outs, bid price, voting

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=480301

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,006
Abstract Views
4,955
Rank
41,618
PlumX Metrics