The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
39 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2004
Date Written: December 2003
Abstract
In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and estimation of a multilateral bargaining model which we use to investigate the consequences of constitutional features of parliamentary democracy for the formation and stability of coalition governments.
Keywords: Political Stability, Coalition Governments, Constitutional Design
JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Diermeier, Daniel and Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio M., The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies (December 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=484363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.484363
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