Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of Central and Eastern European Competition Laws: Have Fears of Over-Enforcement Been Borne Out?

US Dept. of Justice Economic Analysis Group Working Paper No. 04-1

15 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2004

See all articles by Russell W. Pittman

Russell W. Pittman

U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group; Kyiv School of Economics; New Economic School (NES)

Date Written: January 26, 2004

Abstract

Fifteen years ago, when economic reformers were writing and enacting competition laws in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, some critics warned that such laws, or too stringent enforcement of such laws, carried the danger of discouraging competitive behavior and the development of markets. An examination of the enforcement experience with the abuse-of-dominance provisions of the laws of eleven countries over two separate time periods suggests that the feared evils have not materialized. Two patterns stand out in this enforcement experience: first, the number of findings of abuse of dominance has been very small in countries other than Poland, and second, a large and growing proportion of these findings of abuse have been in sectors that would in developed market economies be subject to economic regulation.

Keywords: Antitrust, competition, regulation, abuse of a dominant position, transition, Central and Eastern Europe

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L40, L50, P20

Suggested Citation

Pittman, Russell, Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of Central and Eastern European Competition Laws: Have Fears of Over-Enforcement Been Borne Out? (January 26, 2004). US Dept. of Justice Economic Analysis Group Working Paper No. 04-1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=494862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.494862

Russell Pittman (Contact Author)

U.S. Department of Justice - Economic Analysis Group ( email )

450 5th St. NW
Antitrust Division
Washington, DC 20530
United States
202-307-6367 (Phone)
202-307-3372 (Fax)

Kyiv School of Economics ( email )

vul. Yakira, 13, 3d floor, suite 334
Kyiv, 04119
Ukraine

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

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