Mediating Market Power in Electricity Networks
UC Berkeley, Center for Competition Policy Working Paper No. CPC02-32
37 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2004
Date Written: August 7, 2002
Abstract
We ask under what conditions transmission contracts increase or mitigate market power. We show that the allocation process of transmission rights is crucial. In an efficiently arbitraged uniform price auction generators will only obtain contracts that mitigate their market power. However, if generators inherit transmission contracts or buy them in a 'pay-as-bid' auction, then these contracts can enhance market power. In the two-node network case banning generators from holding transmission contracts that do not correspond to delivery of their own energy mitigates market power. Meshed networks differ in important ways as constrained links no longer isolate prices in competitive markets from market manipulation. The paper suggests ways of minimizing market power considerations when designing transmission contracts.
Keywords: Electricity, market power, transmission rights, nodal pricing
JEL Classification: L1, L12, L94
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
On the Efficiency of Competitive Electricity Markets with Time-Invariant Retail Prices
-
Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment
-
Retail Electricity Competition
By Paul L. Joskow and Jean Tirole
-
Retail Electricity Competition
By Paul L. Joskow and Jean Tirole
-
Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets
By Paul L. Joskow and Jean Tirole
-
Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets
By Paul L. Joskow and Jean Tirole
-
Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets
By Paul L. Joskow and Jean Tirole
-
Competitive Electricity Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity
-
Merchant Transmission Investment
By Paul L. Joskow and Jean Tirole