Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
20 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2004
There are 2 versions of this paper
Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
Date Written: March 2004
Abstract
This Paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission-trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.
Keywords: Agreements, climate, incentives, negotiations, policy
JEL Classification: C72, H23, Q25, Q28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Carlo Carraro (Contact Author)
Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )
Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
+39 04 1234 9166 (Phone)
+39 04 1234 9176 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.carlocarraro.org/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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