Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game

Journal of Law, Economics & Organization: Volume 10 Number 1, April 1994

Posted: 20 Dec 1998

See all articles by Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Abstract

An independent judiciary faces the problem of how to restrain high-court judges from indulging their personal whims. One restraint is the desire of judges to influence future judges. To do so, judges may have to maintain their own or the system's legitimacy by restraining their own behavior. This situation can be viewed as an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. Such a game has many equilibria, some of which are Pareto superior to others. In some equilibria, self-interested judges are responsible even without the threat of external penalties.

JEL Classification: C70, K1

Suggested Citation

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization: Volume 10 Number 1, April 1994, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5318

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Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

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