Residential Segregation in General Equilibrium

47 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2004

See all articles by Patrick J. Bayer

Patrick J. Bayer

Duke University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert McMillan

University of Toronto - Department of Economics

Kim S. Rueben

Tax Policy Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2004

Abstract

This paper studies the causes and consequences of racial segregation using a new general equilibrium model that treats neighborhood compositions as endogenous. The model is estimated using unusually detailed restricted Census microdata covering the entire San Francisco Bay Area, and in combination with a rich array of econometric estimates, serves as a powerful tool for carrying out counterfactual simulations that shed light on the causes and consequences of segregation. In terms of causes, and contrasting with prior research, our GE simulations indicate that equalizing income and education across race would be unlikely to result in significant reductions in racial segregation, as minority households would sort into newly formed minority neighborhoods. Indeed, among Asian and Hispanic households, segregation increases. In terms of consequences, this paper provides the first evidence that sorting on the basis of race gives rise to significant reductions in the consumption of local public goods by minority households and upper-income minority households in particular. These consumption effects are likely to have important intergenerational implications.

Keywords: Segregation, General Equilibrium, Endogenous Sorting, Urban Housing Market, Locational Equilibrium, Counterfactual Simulation, Discrete Choice

JEL Classification: H0, J7, R0, R2

Suggested Citation

Bayer, Patrick J. and McMillan, Robert and Rueben, Kim S., Residential Segregation in General Equilibrium (May 2004). Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 885, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=546485

Patrick J. Bayer (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Robert McMillan

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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Kim S. Rueben

Tax Policy Center ( email )

Urban Institute
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Washington, DC 20009
United States

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