Can Private Giving Promote Economic Segregation?

36 Pages Posted: 19 May 2004

See all articles by Ignatius J. Horstmann

Ignatius J. Horstmann

University of Toronto - Institute for Policy Analysis; University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Kimberley A. Scharf

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)

Al Slivinski

University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

This Paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and locational equilibria. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, may promote economic segregation rather than integration. In such a scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto-improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.

Keywords: Private provision of public goods, jurisdiction formation

JEL Classification: H20, H70

Suggested Citation

Horstmann, Ignatius J. and Horstmann, Ignatius J. and Scharf, Kimberley and Slivinski, Alan, Can Private Giving Promote Economic Segregation? (April 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=547824

Ignatius J. Horstmann (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Institute for Policy Analysis ( email )

140 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G6
Canada

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ihorstmann

Kimberley Scharf

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
44 24 76523 742 (Phone)
44 24 76523 032 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Alan Slivinski

University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics ( email )

Social Science Centre
London, Ontario N6A 5C2
Canada
515-661-3500 (Phone)

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