The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games
CentER Discussion Paper Serie No. 2004-60
17 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004
Date Written: 2004
Abstract
By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established. We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution. Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.
Keywords: Shapley value, equal surplus solution, consensus value
JEL Classification: C71, D71, D63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation