The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games

CentER Discussion Paper Serie No. 2004-60

17 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004

See all articles by Yuan Ju

Yuan Ju

University of York; Tilburg University

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Pieter H. M. Ruys

Tilburg University - CentER

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established. We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution. Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.

Keywords: Shapley value, equal surplus solution, consensus value

JEL Classification: C71, D71, D63

Suggested Citation

Ju, Yuan and Borm, Peter E. M. and Ruys, Pieter H. M., The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games (2004). CentER Discussion Paper Serie No. 2004-60, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=558545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.558545

Yuan Ju (Contact Author)

University of York ( email )

Department of Economics and Related Studies
Heslington
York, YO10 5DD
United Kingdom

Tilburg University

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Pieter H. M. Ruys

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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