Manipulations in Contests

Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner

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Manipulations in Contests

10 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2004

See all articles by Chen Cohen

Chen Cohen

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

We study the classical Tullock's model of one-stage contests where the probability of winning is a function of the efforts exerted by the contestants. We show that by a simple non-discriminating rule, the contest designer is able to manipulate the outcome of the contest such that the probabilities to win are not ordered according to the contestants' abilities.

Keywords: Contests, Tullock's models

JEL Classification: D72, L83

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Cohen, Chen and Sela, Aner, Manipulations in Contests (April 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=559441