Auctioning Divisible Goods

Posted: 10 Aug 1999

See all articles by James J. D. Wang

James J. D. Wang

Duke University

Jaime F. Zender

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance

Date Written: August 1994

Abstract

We consider a model of divisible good auctions that allows for both private information and uncertain noncompetitive demand. By placing restrictions on preferences and distributions, we are able to obtain explicit solutions for linear, symmetric strategy equilibria. The model allows us to examine the effect of price discrimination on the competitive bidders' strategies, the extent to which the bidders' private information is reflected in the stop-out price, and the seller's expected revenue. We find that the seller's expected revenue is increasing in the amount of price discrimination.

JEL Classification: D44, G18

Suggested Citation

Wang, James J. D. and Zender, Jaime F., Auctioning Divisible Goods (August 1994). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5722

James J. D. Wang (Contact Author)

Duke University ( email )

Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7778 (Phone)
919-684-2818 (Fax)

Jaime F. Zender

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance ( email )

Boulder, CO 80309
United States
303-554-1665 (Phone)
303-492-4689 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www-bus.colorado.edu/faculty/Zender/

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