Auctioning Divisible Goods
Posted: 10 Aug 1999
Date Written: August 1994
Abstract
We consider a model of divisible good auctions that allows for both private information and uncertain noncompetitive demand. By placing restrictions on preferences and distributions, we are able to obtain explicit solutions for linear, symmetric strategy equilibria. The model allows us to examine the effect of price discrimination on the competitive bidders' strategies, the extent to which the bidders' private information is reflected in the stop-out price, and the seller's expected revenue. We find that the seller's expected revenue is increasing in the amount of price discrimination.
JEL Classification: D44, G18
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Wang, James J. D. and Zender, Jaime F., Auctioning Divisible Goods (August 1994). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5722
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