Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?
45 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2004 Last revised: 2 Oct 2008
There are 4 versions of this paper
Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?
Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?
Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?
Date Written: October 19, 2005
Abstract
Twenty countries around the world have used $27 billion in incentives such as bonus shares and discounts to attract retail investors to participate in privatizations and to discourage them from flipping. Our results show that incentives have performed well, increasing retail investor participation much more cost-effectively than underpricing. Flipping is not only much reduced in the short term, but also declines by at least 15% over a period of 1,000 trading days. The expiration of bonus share plans is associated with a six-day abnormal return of -1.1% and a long-term increase in trading volume.
Keywords: Privatization, Equity Offerings, Bonus Shares, Discounts, Flipping
JEL Classification: D78, G14, G32, G38, L33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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