Executive Rank, Pay, and Project Selection

Posted: 11 Nov 2004

See all articles by John Barron

John Barron

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Glen R. Waddell

University of Oregon - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract

This paper extends the literature on CEO compensation by developing and testing a principal-agent model of executive compensation in the context of project selection. The model's focus on executive project selection decisions highlights the multi-dimensional nature of executive choices that affect the value of the firm. An executive not only makes an effort choice that determines the quality of information on which to base a decision, but also sets the decision criteria for selecting projects. A project selection framework is also shown to introduce endogenous uncertainty into compensation that can influence the executive's effort choice. Using an extensive dataset, our empirical work supports the main hypotheses of the model, including the significance of executive rank in determining the extent of use of incentive pay in general, and equity-based incentive pay in particular.

Keywords: Executive compensation, agency theory, incentive pay

JEL Classification: J33, J41, L29

Suggested Citation

Barron, John M. and Waddell, Glen R., Executive Rank, Pay, and Project Selection. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=616802

John M. Barron

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
765-494-4451 (Phone)
765-494-9658 (Fax)

Glen R. Waddell (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-1259 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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