Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?

44 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by José Anson

José Anson

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne)

Marcelo Olarreaga

University of Geneva; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Date Written: October 2003

Abstract

Anson, Cadot, and Olarreaga provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia.

This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of customs corruption.

Suggested Citation

Anson, José and Olarreaga, Marcelo and Cadot, Olivier, Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help? (October 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636575

José Anson (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

Marcelo Olarreaga

University of Geneva ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Olivier Cadot

University of Lausanne - School of Economics and Business Administration (HEC-Lausanne) ( email )

Unil Dorigny, Batiment Internef
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3463 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3495 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States