Households' Deposit Insurance Coverage: Evidence and Analysis of Potential Reforms

Posted: 14 Jun 1995

See all articles by Arthur B. Kennickell

Arthur B. Kennickell

Federal Reserve Board - Department of Research & Statistics

Myron L. Kwast

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Martha Starr

Greylock McKinnon Associates; Independent

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

It is often suggested that reducing deposit insurance would reduce problems with moral hazard in the banking industry. However, little is known about likely effects of proposed reforms on household depositors. This study uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to examine the characteristics of household depositors, particularly those with uninsured funds. We find that large depositors tend to have substantial shares of their assets in insured depositories, yet often fail to keep their holdings within insurance limits. Various explanations for these facts are considered. We also simulate the effects of proposed reforms on the pool of uninsured depositors.

JEL Classification: G21, G28, D12

Suggested Citation

Kennickell, Arthur B. and Kwast, Myron L. and Starr, Martha and Starr, Martha, Households' Deposit Insurance Coverage: Evidence and Analysis of Potential Reforms. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6369

Arthur B. Kennickell

Federal Reserve Board - Department of Research & Statistics ( email )

20th & C. St., N.W.
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-2247 (Phone)
202-452-5295 (Fax)

Myron L. Kwast

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-2909 (Phone)
202-452-3819 (Fax)

Martha Starr (Contact Author)

Greylock McKinnon Associates ( email )

1 Memorial Drive, Suite 1410
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
12025773640 (Phone)

Independent

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
900
PlumX Metrics