Pipe Dreams? The Performance of Companies Issuing Equity Privately

54 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2004 Last revised: 4 Aug 2022

See all articles by David J. Brophy

David J. Brophy

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Clemens Sialm

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paige Ouimet

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) have become an important source of financing for young, publicly traded firms whose poor operating performance may limit alternative financing options. We propose that firms are motivated to sell these securities to minimize costs associated with asymmetric information. We find that both the security structure and the investor composition of a PIPE security matter in the subsequent performance of the issuing firm. Poor post-issuance performance is associated with securities where investors obtain significant repricing rights, which protect them from future stock price declines. Furthermore, companies that obtain financing from hedge funds tend to under-perform companies that obtain financing from other institutional investors. We argue that hedge funds act as investors of last resort, playing an important role in the market for young, high-risk firms with substantial asymmetric information. Hedge funds are willing to fund such high-risk companies because they can protect against possible price declines in the issuing companies by either negotiating PIPE securities with repricing rights or by entering into short positions of the underlying stocks of the issuing companies.

Suggested Citation

Brophy, David J. and Sialm, Clemens and Ouimet, Paige, Pipe Dreams? The Performance of Companies Issuing Equity Privately (December 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w11011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=641065

David J. Brophy

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
313-764-7587 (Phone)

Clemens Sialm (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.mccombs.utexas.edu/Clemens.Sialm/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paige Ouimet

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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