Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies

London Business School IFA Working Paper Series

50 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2005

See all articles by Heitor Almeida

Heitor Almeida

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Murillo Campello

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 16, 2006

Abstract

We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge future investment against income shortfalls, reducing current debt (saving debt capacity) is a more effective way to boost investment in future high cash flow states. This tradeoff implies that constrained firms will prefer cash to debt capacity if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating income and investment opportunities is low), but will prefer debt capacity to cash if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of cash and debt policies of a large sample of constrained and unconstrained firms reveals evidence that is consistent with our theory. In particular, financially constrained firms with high hedging needs show a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows, while displaying no propensity to reduce debt. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs systematically channel cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt in the presence of financing frictions.

Keywords: Risk management, financing frictions, investment, cash savings, debt capacity

JEL Classification: G31, G32

Suggested Citation

Almeida, Heitor and Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Campello, Murillo, Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies (May 16, 2006). London Business School IFA Working Paper Series, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=650997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.650997

Heitor Almeida

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Viral V. Acharya (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Murillo Campello

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

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United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/Faculty-And-Research/Profile.aspx?id=mnc35

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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