Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror
40 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2005
Date Written: November 2004
Abstract
The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.
Keywords: Defense economics, defensive preemption, counter-terrorism, terror, international judges, profiling
JEL Classification: D81, H56
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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