Why Do Firms Hold so Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation

44 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2005

See all articles by C. Fritz Foley

C. Fritz Foley

Harvard University - Business School (HBS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jay C. Hartzell

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Sheridan Titman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Garry J. Twite

University of Melbourne - Department of Finance; University of Melbourne - Faculty of Business and Economics; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets, and these cash holdings have been justified in the existing empirical literature by transaction costs and precautionary motives. An additional explanation, considered in this study, is that U.S. multinational firms hold cash in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. Estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the tax burden from repatriating foreign income is associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets. In addition, certain firms, specifically those that are less financially constrained domestically and those that are more technology intensive, exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.

Keywords: Cash, Taxes, Repatriation

JEL Classification: G30, G38

Suggested Citation

Foley, C. Fritz and Hartzell, Jay C. and Titman, Sheridan and Twite, Garry J. and Twite, Garry J., Why Do Firms Hold so Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation (February 2007). AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=654881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.654881

C. Fritz Foley

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6375 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jay C. Hartzell (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

1 University Station B6600
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-6779 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/jay.hartzell/

Sheridan Titman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-232-2787 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Garry J. Twite

University of Melbourne - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Department of Finance
Melbourne, VIC 3010
Australia
+61 3 90356172 (Phone)

University of Melbourne - Department of Finance ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Parkville, Victoria 3010 3010
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN) ( email )

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,628
Abstract Views
7,617
Rank
18,321
PlumX Metrics