Branch Banking and the Geography of Bank Pricing
Posted: 25 Aug 1998
Abstract
We show that bank branching tends to mitigate localized market power by broadening the geographic scope of competition among banks. Banking services at peripheral locations will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch networks. We develop a theoretical model in support of this view and also offer empirical evidence.
JEL Classification: G2, D4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Calem, Paul S. and Nakamura, Leonard I., Branch Banking and the Geography of Bank Pricing. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6647
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.