Branch Banking and the Geography of Bank Pricing

Posted: 25 Aug 1998

See all articles by Paul S. Calem

Paul S. Calem

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Leonard I. Nakamura

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Abstract

We show that bank branching tends to mitigate localized market power by broadening the geographic scope of competition among banks. Banking services at peripheral locations will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch networks. We develop a theoretical model in support of this view and also offer empirical evidence.

JEL Classification: G2, D4

Suggested Citation

Calem, Paul S. and Nakamura, Leonard I., Branch Banking and the Geography of Bank Pricing. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6647

Paul S. Calem (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )

Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States

Leonard I. Nakamura

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )

Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
215-574-3804 (Phone)
215-574-4364 (Fax)

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