Aggregation of Expert Opinions
41 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2005
Date Written: April 2005
Abstract
Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents are "informationally small". We further show that as the number of informed agents becomes large the necessary distortion goes to zero. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. In particular, the equilibria we analyze are "conditionally" dominant strategy in a precise sense. Further, the mechanisms are immune to manipulation by small groups of agents.
Keywords: Information aggregation, Asymmetric information, Cheap talk, Experts
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty
-
Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information
-
Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem
By Grigory Kosenok and Sergei Severinov
-
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (Second Version)