On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning

Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-12

46 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Talbot Page

Talbot Page

Brown University - Department of Economics

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Matthias M. Cinyabuguma

University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why collective action sometimes succeeds despite the prediction of received theory. But while individually imposed sanctions lead to higher contributions in public goods experiments, there is usually little or no net efficiency gain from them, because punishment is costly and at times misdirected. We document the frequency and probable causes of punishment of high contributors in several recent studies, and we report a new experiment which shows that introducing higher-order punishment opportunities offer a partial solution to the problem, but also reveal the deep-seatedness of retaliatory tendencies.

Keywords: Public goods, collective action, experiment, punishment, demand

JEL Classification: C91, H41, D71

Suggested Citation

Page, Talbot and Putterman, Louis G. and Cinyabuguma, Matthias M., On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning (2004). Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724228

Talbot Page (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
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Louis G. Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-3837 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Matthias M. Cinyabuguma

University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) - Department of Economics ( email )

1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, MD 21250
United States