The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (Cepa) between Mainland China and Hong Kong - Legal and Economic Analyses

Trading Arrangements in the Pacific Rim: ASEAN and APEC, September 2004

10 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2006

See all articles by Henry S. Gao

Henry S. Gao

Singapore Management University - Yong Pung How School of Law

Abstract

On 29 June 2003, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China (the Mainland) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). As the first Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) for both sides, the CEPA provides a model for China to use the arrangements allowed under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to further trade liberalisation and promote economic development. This article discusses the legal issues raised under the WTO rules as well as the possible economic implications of CEPA. Legally speaking, the CEPA probably satisfies the requirements for a Free-trade Area (FTA) under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and an Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) under Article V of the GATS. Several provisions of the CEPA, however, might lead to potential legal disputes in the WTO. Economically speaking, the CEPA is unlikely to solve the economic problems in Hong Kong.

Keywords: CEPA, WTO, China, Hong Kong, FTA, RTA, EIA, GATT, GATS, Dispute Settlement, Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement

JEL Classification: F17, H63, K34

Suggested Citation

Gao, Henry S., The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (Cepa) between Mainland China and Hong Kong - Legal and Economic Analyses . Trading Arrangements in the Pacific Rim: ASEAN and APEC, September 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=752785

Henry S. Gao (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - Yong Pung How School of Law ( email )

55 Armenian Street
Singapore, 179943
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.smu.edu.sg/faculty/law/henrygao.asp

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