Experimental Tests for Gender Effects in a Principal-Agent Game
20 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2005 Last revised: 5 Feb 2024
Date Written: August 1, 2005
Abstract
We examine data from a laboratory test in which pairs of subjects are given the task of negotiating a wage-labor agreement. We find limited evidence for gender differences in the content of wage agreements and differences in trusting behavior.
Keywords: Experimental economics, Gender, Principal-Agency
JEL Classification: C78, C92, J16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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