Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections, Second Version

43 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2005

See all articles by Enriqueta Aragones

Enriqueta Aragones

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis

Thomas R. Palfrey

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

We analyze conditions under which campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters' strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege of their campaign promises, and all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.

Note: A previous version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=719985

Keywords: Repeated Elections, Commitment, Reputation

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Aragonés, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Postlewaite, Andrew, Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections, Second Version (September 2005). PIER Working Paper No. 05-027, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=817024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.817024

Enriqueta Aragonés

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis ( email )

08193 Bellaterra
Spain
34-93-580-6612 (Phone)
34-93-580-1452 (Fax)

Thomas R. Palfrey

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
301A Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4088 (Phone)
626-4432-1726 (Fax)

Andrew Postlewaite (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
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Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew