Structural Reform Litigation: Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Forthcoming
41 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2005
There are 2 versions of this paper
Structural Reform Litigation: Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift
Abstract
Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift.
Keywords: public law litigation, agency, bureaucratic drift, bargaining, enforcement
JEL Classification: K23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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