Structural Reform Litigation: Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Forthcoming

41 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2005

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Pennsylvania State University; Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School

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Abstract

Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift.

Keywords: public law litigation, agency, bureaucratic drift, bargaining, enforcement

JEL Classification: K23

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and Feldmann, Sven E., Structural Reform Litigation: Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=844824

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8171 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8144 (Fax)

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