Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

Carlo Alberto Notebook Working Paper No. 24

36 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2005

See all articles by Luis C. Corchón

Luis C. Corchón

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Economics

Matteo Triossi

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Management

Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

Keywords: State Dependent Feasible Sets, Nash Implementation, Renegotition

JEL Classification: C72, D60, D78

Suggested Citation

Corchón Diaz, Luis Carlos and Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria, Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach (September 2006). Carlo Alberto Notebook Working Paper No. 24, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=864045 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.864045

Luis Carlos Corchón Diaz

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Matteo Maria Triossi Verondini (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Management ( email )

San Giobbe, Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy