Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunications Markets: A Policy Framework
TILEC Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-010
30 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2005
Date Written: September 2004
Abstract
We analyze a repeated setting of an asymmetric, differentiated telecommunications market with an incumbent and an entrant. The entrant may roll out its own network or use parts of the incumbent's network. The incumbent is established in the market, while the entrant gradually builds up a track record for quality. We investigate different entry strategies and regulatory policies and discuss entrants' incentives to invest in network depending on regulatory choices.
Keywords: Telecommunication, Access Price, Interconnection Charge, Network, Regulation
JEL Classification: L96, L51, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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