Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunications Markets: A Policy Framework

TILEC Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-010

30 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2005

See all articles by Paul de Bijl

Paul de Bijl

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

We analyze a repeated setting of an asymmetric, differentiated telecommunications market with an incumbent and an entrant. The entrant may roll out its own network or use parts of the incumbent's network. The incumbent is established in the market, while the entrant gradually builds up a track record for quality. We investigate different entry strategies and regulatory policies and discuss entrants' incentives to invest in network depending on regulatory choices.

Keywords: Telecommunication, Access Price, Interconnection Charge, Network, Regulation

JEL Classification: L96, L51, L13

Suggested Citation

de Bijl, Paul W.J. and Peitz, Martin, Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunications Markets: A Policy Framework (September 2004). TILEC Discussion Paper Series No. 2004-010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=870263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.870263

Paul W.J. De Bijl (Contact Author)

CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
The Hague, 2508 GM
Netherlands
+31 70 3383380 (Phone)
+31 70 3383350 (Fax)

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 621 181-1835 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://peitz.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/

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