Disorganization
53 Pages Posted: 2 May 1997 Last revised: 24 Jun 2008
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Disorganization
Date Written: January 15, 1997
Abstract
Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for critical inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inefficiently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers, output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical evidence suggests that outputs has fallen farthest for the goods with the most complex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the former Soviet Union than in the Central Europe.
JEL Classification: E10, P1, E32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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