Optimal Agenda-Setter Timing

19 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2006

See all articles by Mattias Polborn

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University; IfW Kiel; KU Leuven; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 15, 2006

Abstract

We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.

Keywords: Dynamic political economy, agenda-setter power, investment, timing problems

JEL Classification: C7, D7

Suggested Citation

Polborn, Mattias K. and Willmann, Gerald, Optimal Agenda-Setter Timing (April 15, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=897102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.897102

Mattias K. Polborn (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universitätsstraße 25
Bielefeld, NRW 33613
Germany

IfW Kiel ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, Schleswig-Hosltein D-24100
Germany

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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