Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers

80 Pages Posted: 1 May 2006

Abstract

This article focuses attention on antitrust law goals other than economic efficiency by contrasting them to economic goals both in terms of their substantive content and their underlying assumptions. Alternative articulations of the nonefficiency goals are examined to state as precisely as possible what legislators, judges, and scholars had in mind when advocating these goals. Although one can easily appreciate the political and social values scholars and policy makers espouse, it is difficult to identify from the current literature in this area either the connection between mergers generally and undesirable consequences of those particular mergers most likely to have unwanted side effects. Although this article calls for greater specificity and precision by proponents of nonefficiency goals, it also argues that many of these goals can be included systematically in antitrust enforcement. In response to the appeal of social and political values and their established place in antitrust cases, this Article suggests a more dynamic and democratic interpretation of economic efficiency that incorporates a broader spectrum of values.

Keywords: economic efficiency, antitrust, mergers and acquisitions, Clayton Act, competition policy, corporate acquisitions

Suggested Citation

Barnes, David W., Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers. William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 30, p. 787, 1989, Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 899789, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899789

David W. Barnes (Contact Author)

Seton Hall Law School ( email )

One Newark Center
Newark, NJ 07102
United States
201-709-8829 (Phone)
973-642-8194 (Fax)

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