Conditions for Efficiency in Package Pricing
Posted: 17 Jun 2006
Date Written: July 2004
Abstract
This paper shows that when amonopolist uses a nonlinear pricing (package pricing), and consumer valuations are non-ordered (or demands cross), then the pro maximizing output sold to all types of consumer can also be welfare maximizing. Conditions derived show that this result is not rare and some observable indicators can be used to infer about this overall socially efficient outcome.
Keywords: Price discrimination, non-linear pricing, Pareto Efficiency
JEL Classification: D42, L10, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Nahata, Babu and Kokovin, Sergey G. and Zhelobodko, Evegeny, Conditions for Efficiency in Package Pricing (July 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=909282
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